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Abstract 
 
Responding to the call to theorise praxis in relation to philosophy and white diversity 
research, I draw on philosophers of race, and in particular, collective white ignorance, 
and generous encounters to argue for listening as a form of progressive white praxis. 
Whilst praxis has been theorised in feminist theory in relation to knowledge, standpoint 
and bodies,  literature neglects how whiteness structures the production of knowledge  
and praxis. I argue that an understanding of white praxis should entail an examination 
of white epistemology, white ignorance and encounters with the stranger. At the same 
time, heeding critical race theorists’ cautions about critical whiteness studies and white 
feminism, I propose ways in which listening could begin to work as a form of white 
praxis responding to racism in research on diversity and organisations.  
 
 
What Can White People Do? Listening, Challenging Ignorance, Generous 
Encounters, and the ‘Not Yet’ as Diversity Research Praxis  
 
 
‘But what are white people to do?’ That question is not necessarily misguided, 
although it does re-center on white agency… It is a question asked persistently in 
response to hearing about racism and colonialism…The impulse towards action 
is understandable and complicated; it can be both a defense against the ‘shock’ of 
hearing about racism (and the shock of the complicity revealed by the very 
‘shock’ that ‘this’ was a ‘shock’); it can be an impulse to reconciliation as a ‘re-
covering’ of the past (the desire to feel better); it can be about making public 
one’s judgment (‘what happened was wrong’); or it can be an expression of 
solidarity (‘I am with you’); or it can simply an orientation towards the openness 
of the future (rephrased as: ‘what can be done?’). But the question, in all of these 
modes of utterance, can work to block hearing; in moving on from the present 
towards the future, it can also move away from the object of critique, or place the 
white subject ‘outside’ that critique in the present of the hearing. In other words, 
the desire to act, to move, or even to move on, can stop the message ‘getting 
through’ (Ahmed, 2004). 
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Introduction  
 
In this important quote, critical race theorist, Sara Ahmed challenges the motivation of 
those us position as white to  take central stage and act, which speaks directly to the call 
for papers for this special issue. Our urgency as white people blocks understanding our 
own complicity in racism and colonialism.  Or in the words of black philosopher, 
George Yancy ‘white people [should] not to move too quickly when confronted by the 
muck and mire of their own whiteness (2015: 3). Ahmed insists that white people’s 
yearning to make a difference means that we see ourselves as the source of good praxis, 
denying the agency and capacity of the Other and over-emphasising our ability to 
transcend the conditions of white power. Acting blocks Others. By detailing the ways 
that acting for Others can be a form of self-protection and self-aggrandisement, she 
raises incisive questions for critical diversity research praxis and the perennial anxiety: 
‘what can white people do’ (Ahmed, 2004; Alcoff, 1998)? 
 
To think about this question means defining whiteness, no easy task because whiteness 
is so complex, systemic, often-hidden and multidimensional. Critical whiteness 
theorists from African American W.E.B. DuBois in 1935 onwards emphasise that 
whiteness is not just about phenotype but power and privilege (Nkomo and Al Ariss, 
2014; Mills). Hence, critical whiteness studies examines the social, economic and 
political significance of whiteness and its connection to the persistence of racism (Guess, 
2006: 630-31). Whiteness has been conceptualized through various perspectives as a 
constellation of social and cultural practices, a performance, a bodily style, a discursive 
practice, a psychosocial process, a strategic resource, an epistemology, lived bodily 
experience and a relation to space (Frankenberg, 2001; Levine-Rasky, 2016; Moreton-
Robinson, 2001; Steyn and Conway, 2010). An influential definition is Ruth 
Frankenberg’s (1993) characterisation of whiteness as a location of structural privilege, a 
standpoint from which white people understand themselves in relation to others and a 
set of cultural practices.  Whiteness is ‘the production and reproduction of dominance 
rather than subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather 
than disadvantage’ (Frankenberg, 1993 cited Nkomo and Al Ariss, 2014: 390).  
Whiteness is relational, contextual and intersectional, and not essentially attached to 
white bodies nor monolithic, unified, or fixed; hence, white is distinguished from 
whiteness (Bonnett, 1996; Frankenberg, 1993; McLaren, 2000; Levine-Rasky, 2016).   
 
Whiteness operates ideologically, discursively, bodily culturally and materially with 
white privilege bestowed, protected, and legitimated through various state, cultural, 
institutional and organisational mechanisms and discourses which work overt and 
covertly (ibid). Whilst whiteness as a site of privilege is intersected by gender and class, 
these other axes of advantage and subordination do not ‘render irrelevant race privilege 
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but, rather inflect or modify it (Frankenberg, 2001: 76). Hence, ‘all whites have access to 
symbolic capital of whiteness’ (Nkomo and Al Ariss, 2014: 396). In essence, whiteness 
shift in its effects and manifestations in different national, historical and colonial 
contexts. As Peter McLaren writes, ‘white culture is not monolithic, and its borders 
must be understood as malleable and porous. It is the historically specific confluence of 
economic, geopolitical and ethnocultural processes’ (2000: 148).   
 
The call for papers invites critical diversity researchers to bring philosophy to bear on 
praxis in relation to social change and addressing inequalities, and I turn to 
philosophers of race and whiteness to explore white praxis in relation to diversity 
studies research. Black activists and academics insist white academics often to do too 
much without any real understanding of their own complicity in racism and hence, 
white researchers need to listen and learn (Ahmed, 2004; Davis, 2010; Thompson, 2003; 
Yancy, 2015). White academics don't always recognise that race matters or that their 
agency is connected to their status as white (Appelbaum, 2008). Moreover, black 
activists and academics stress the job of racially minoritised people is not to teach white 
people, or make white people feel good (Dreher, 2009; Srivastava, 2005).  
 
Of significance to this paper is that white feminism has been criticised for its collective 
ignorance and complicity in racism. Whiteness is inflected by class with white middle 
class femininity associated with being and doing good, dating back to colonial Christian 
femininities (Appelbaum, 2010; Haggis and Scheh, 2000). Furthermore, black activists 
and academics caution white feminists to think carefully about mobilising the category 
of woman as a universal bond of identification; wanting to be and do good, meaning 
well, and speaking on behalf of Others (Alcoff, 1991; Ahmed, 2000; Appelbaum, 2010; 
Haggis and Schech, 2000; Moreton-Robinson, 2000; 2010). Thus, white middle class 
feminists must keep learning about their whiteness, privilege, power and complicity, 
without ever achieving anti-racist status, transcending whiteness, or desiring to master 
knowledge of the Other (Alcoff, 2006; Dreher, 2009).  Indeed, much feminist praxis, in 
spite of ‘mantras of difference’ is ‘remarkably white’ (Haggis and Schech, 2000: 387). 
This is not to say that black feminist activism or scholarship does not exist nor make 
significant strides. Indeed, contra to the postfeminist marketing injunction, white 
feminists should not ‘just do it’.  
 
In this paper, I ask what not rushing to act means for white feminists in critical diversity 
studies and organisational studies. How might hearing racism become praxis? 
Although philosophers of race debate how possible white progressive praxis is in 
relation to race and racism. For instance, Charles Mills, Linda Alcoff, George Yancy and 
Shannon Sullivan  are doubtful about the potential for white people to change; with 
Sullivan, the most hopeful, even describing what she does as ‘pessimistic activism’ 
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(2007: 233). For Mills, a leading North American black philosopher, white habits are so 
difficult to shift because they garner white people a ‘material payoff…rooted in a 
political economy of systematic racial advantage (cited Sullivan, 2007:  233). White 
people are too invested in whiteness to change. Moreover, ‘well-intentioned’ white 
people can further ‘re-embed racism’ as they attempt to transform white habits 
(Sullivan, 2007: 233). But this ‘double bind’ catalyses action, because if white people can 
stop worrying about themselves, they can ‘spend more energy figuring out the situation 
and what might be done to improve it’ (Sullivan 200: 234). But critical race theorists are 
wary of white praxis because as they vehemently critique it can recentre the white self 
as a good white person: on the ‘good side’, someone who ‘gets it’ (Yancy, 2015). Intense 
questions are raised as to whether white people can address systemic racism in which 
they are deeply implicated. Thus, critical race theorists and activists view white praxis 
with suspicion and cynicism.  
 
In response to the call, I focus on race and whiteness, and their theorising, as opposed to 
other social axes of difference, because there is a need for research in critical diversity 
studies in relation to whiteness, racism and racialisation. In so doing, I do not discuss 
ethnicity or ethnic privilege which need their own focus given the complex debates on 
racialisation of ethnicity and racialisation of religion and my focus on diversity studies 
in the US, Australia and UK, where the racialisation of blackness structures cultural and 
material practices of whiteness. As far back as 1992 Stella Nkomo questioned the 
whiteness of organisational studies, and nearly fifteen years ago, Diane Grimes (2001) 
wrote that whiteness shapes who and what is not heard in organisational studies. 
Indeed as Stella Nkomo and Akram Al Ariss (2014) stress the complex history of race 
and white privilege in organisations dates back to the nineteenth century and yet, 
organisation studies still marginalises such research, meaning that white privilege is 
largely invisible, and  race seen only to affect black and minoritised people (2014: 398). 
Whilst there is an emergent literature on whiteness in organisations, mostly but not 
always led by academics of colour, it still a marginal topic of research and teaching, 
even in critical diversity studies, where gender is often prioritised (Al Ariss et al., 2014; 
Grimes, 2000; 2001; Hunter, 2010; Hunter et al, 2010. Liu and Baker, 2014; Liu & 
Pechenkina, 2016; MaCalpine, & Marsh, 2005; Nkomo, 200; Nkomo and Al Ariss, 2014; 
Parker and Grimes, 2009; Samaluk, 2014; Shore, 2002, 2010; Swan, 2010).   
 
How can we understand this relative neglect in both mainstream organisational studies 
and critical diversity studies? How to account for a systemic ignorance of racism and 
whiteness in diversity and organisational management studies. To examine the 
complexities of white praxis, I turn to critical race theorists who describe the collective 
white production of ignorance, followed by emerging literature on the politics of 
listening. My aim is to show how listening may be one way in which white academics 
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can contribute to praxis as kind of ‘not doing doing’. I listen to these literatures in a 
deep, sustained way so that their challenges can be heard: ‘to tarry’ in relation to 
whiteness and race, as Yancy proposes (2015). Whilst the ideas of white philosophers, 
Judith Butler and Michel Foucault influence critical diversity theorists intensively, to 
date, work on the ‘white epistemology of ignorance’ (Mills, 1997; 2000; 2007), generous 
encountering and the phenomenology of whiteness have yet to stop white academics in 
their tracks (Ahmed, 2000; 2004). And yet, Ahmed and Mills offer incisive philosophical 
arguments about racism and praxis through a genealogy of critical race theorists such as 
Lorde, Fanon, Du Bois, Spivak insist that before acting, white people must learn about 
their participation and investment in racism, in ways which mean they can never 
‘arrive’, a good white, fixed, in a ‘state of anti-racism’ (Yancy, 2015): acknowledging, As 
George Lipsitz puts it, ‘the impossibility of the anti-racist white subject’ (cited 
Wiegman, 1999: 123).  
 
My aim is to contribute to knowledge about praxis in relation to race and critical 
diversity, responding to the call for papers with a focus on philosophical ideas, but 
drawn uniquely from philosophy of race. In writing the paper, as a white British middle 
aged middle class white women currently living and working in Australia, I was keen 
to avoid the kind of white-indulgent self-reflexivity that returns white narcissism to the 
centre, and taking a lead from white critical whiteness theorist,  Shelly Tochluk’s (2010) 
approach, I use pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’ to speak directly to white people, which may 
be potentially distancing for people of colour but attempt to to place myself in relation 
to whiteness. In speaking to white people, I am not recentring whiteness but calling it to 
account.  
 
Praxically Speaking  
 
First to explain praxis, by providing a brief overview of definitional work. In explaining 
the meaning of praxis, scholars recount its long history back to Ancient Greece and 
Aristole’s conceptualisation of praxis as a specialised form of knowing based on action, 
which he distinguished from theoretical knowing (Holmes and Warelow, 2000). 
Furthermore, for Artistole, apprehending theoretical knowledge required practical 
ability (Liinason, 2007: 52).  Theorists turn to Karl Marx as the next thinker who 
explained praxis as the conscious analysis of social conditions needed to transform the 
self and the world. Philosopher Peter Critchley (1997) emphasises that for Marx, true 
knowledge was not contemplative but active. Hence, for Marx, knowing practices entail 
‘being in’ and ‘acting upon the world’ (Critchley, 1997). After Marx, other leading 
praxis thinkers include Hannah Arendt for whom praxis represents a concern for care 
and well-being and for Paulo Freire praxis is conscienzation, learning about the world 
in order to change it for the better. The common ground for these thinkers is that praxis 
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refers to how theory and practice, thoughts and action are dialectical (Holmes and 
Warelow, 2000): a way of knowing that transforms what is known and intervenes in the 
world to transform it (Benesch, 2013).  
 
Second wave feminism brought a particular emphasis to the relation between 
positionality, ways of knowing and praxis, with Liz Stanley (1990) in her edited book, 
distinguishing praxis as ‘knowledge for’ not ‘knowledge what’.  Subsequently, for 
feminists and critical race theorists, praxis closes the separation between subject and 
object, knowledge and reality, and theory and practice (Ahmed 1996, 1998; hooks 1994). 
Theory is not applied to something called practice, like a coat of conceptual paint onto a 
worldy wall. Thus, Sara Ahmed insists that feminist theory ‘intervenes in sites of 
inequality’ through ‘interpretative and communicative strategies’ to bring about social 
change (1996: 79). Whilst theorists differ on how to interpret how theory and practice 
work together, most agree that praxis entails an intimate relationship between thought 
and action (Holmes and Warelow, 2000).  
 
But this means asking how to conceptualise knowledge production. And who does it, 
given that social identities and the context of knowers affect epistemic practices: a 
critical issue in feminist epistemology as the authors in the call for papers stress (Alcoff, 
2007; Sullivan, 2006). In this vein, feminist Mia Liinason (2007) argues that 
understanding praxis as phenomenologically contextual helps to distinguish between 
‘rationalist knowledge’ with its epistemic separation between subject and object; and 
‘knowledge as praxis’ based on a two-way relation of ‘mutual dependence’ between 
subject and object. Praxis is phenomenological because making knowledge is about 
‘being attentive’ to the world through embodied relations. In other words, the knowing 
subject and her habits, norms, customs and relations are ‘deeply interwoven’ in an 
embodied way in knowledge production. Our ‘relation to the world, and thus our 
knowledge of the world, is derived from our position in the world’ (2007: 53). Liianon’s 
main point is that feminist scholarship cannot avoid power asymmetries because it is 
intertwined with culture, politics and power. Power is part of a feminist’s relation to her 
research. This means that feminist research should not reconstruct the world but rather 
examine our relations to the world.  
 
And yet, whilst the work of Ahmed who is critical race and queer theorist influences 
Liinason strangely, and yet perhaps, predictably, she does not foreground race’s 
relation to epistemic practices. She does not examine bodies, habits or relations as 
racialised, and fails to see how epistemic resources are distributed differentially by race 
and thus, how ignorance is produced within an economic, cultural and social system 
(Alcoff, 2007). In response to this neglect, I suggest we need to ask how race affects 
knowledge production. If as Liinason writes, our bodies, habits, norms, customs and 
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ideas inflect how knowledge is produced, then how will white habits, norms, customs 
and ideas affect how knowledge about race and racism is produced (or not)? How do 
white academics become ‘inattentive’ rather than ‘attentive’ to race? How does it 
become something that is not perceived, not apprehended? And what does this mean 
for praxis? To address these issues, I introduce philosophers of white ignorance.  
 
White Ignorance 
 
Theorists stress that whiteness operates through ignorance. For example, Peter  
McLaren argues that:  
Whiteness operates by means of its constitution as a universalizing authority by 
which the hegemonic, white, bourgeois subject appropriates the right to speak on 
behalf of everyone who is non-white while denying voice and agency to these 
others in the name of civilised humankind. Whiteness constitutes and 
demarcates ideas, feelings, knowledge, social practices, cultural formations, and 
systems of intelligibility that are identified with or attributed to white people and 
that are invested in by white people as ‘white’.  Whiteness is also a refusal to 
acknowledge how people are implicated in certain social relations of privilege 
and relations of domination and subordination. Whiteness, then, can be 
considered as a form of social amnesia associated with modes of subjectivity 
within particular sites (2000: 150).       
Hence, to understand how white people are complicit in racism intentionally, 
unintentionally, collectively and unconsciously, critical race philosophers theorise a 
white ‘epistemology of ignorance’ (Frye, 1983; Mills, 1997, 2007; Sullivan and Tuana, 
2007). Du Bois, author of Souls of White Folks in 1935 was one of the first theorists of 
whiteness to question white superiority and white privilege as a global racist system 
long before the emergence of critical white studies (Rabaka, 2007). DuBois insists on 
understanding white supremacy as global and social, so systemic and systematic, and 
personal and political i.e. to do with racist mores and manners (ibid). Extending his 
project, black philosopher Charles Mills has written extensively on the racialised 
dynamics of knowing. His overall view is that white people see the world from a 
distorted white ‘standpoint’ authorised by a racialised social contract (1997; 2007; 2008).  
As he explains:  
 
on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an 
inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of 
localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and 
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socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites ill in general be 
unable to understand the world they themselves have made (1997: 2).  
 
Thus, he stresses that white people ‘will in general be unable to understand the world 
they themselves have made’ (1997: 18). In this view, a white point of view ‘projects a 
‘delusional world,’ ‘a racial fantasyland,’ and ‘a consensual hallucination’ (Gibson, cited 
in Mills, 1997: 18). To produce this collective ignorance, white people participate in a 
deep and systematic form of forgetting about, or refusing to recognise, their implication 
in relations of domination, subordination and privilege; and the injustice, cruelty and 
suffering they cause (Mills, 1997; 2007; 2008; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007).  
 
The main thrust of this scholarship is to de-individualise white ignorance, explaining its 
historic, collective manufacture, processes and effects. Hence, ignorance in relation to 
race constitutes more than a ‘gap in knowledge’, an ‘epistemic oversight’, or ‘anomaly’ 
(Mills, 1997, 2007; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007). Indeed, ignorance is not the opposite of 
knowledge: the production of ignorance entails the production of knowledge. As Alcoff 
sums it up pithily: theorists see ignorance ‘not as a feature of neglectful epistemic 
practice but as a substantive epistemic practice in itself’ (2007:39).   
 
Of great significance is that white ignorance requires active individual and collective 
labour, ‘appalling achievement’ and ‘grotesque prodigious effort’ (Spelman 2007:120).  
White ignorance is not about an individual lack of knowledge or motivation but a 
structural epistemic formation based on individual and collective positive pay-offs 
(Mills, 1997; Alcoff, 2007).  Hence, it is a systematic, ‘implicit agreement to misrepresent 
the world’ (Mills, 1997: 80). A wilful ignorance which is ‘socially acceptable’ (Alcoff, 
2007). Importantly, this lack of knowledge is not accidental but actively produced to 
dominate and exploit (Mills, 1997; 2007; 2008; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007). White people 
are motivated- even desire- to stay ignorant. Hence, for Mills, the racial contract 
prescribes ignorance. Thus, ‘structured blindness and opacities’ are required to 
establish and maintain the white polity’ (Mills, 1997: 19). Ignorance is epistemic, ethical, 
political and moral: the ‘cognitive and moral economy psychically required for 
conquest, colonization, and enslavement’ (Mills, 1997: 18–19).  
 
The aim of the racial state, the legal system, the economy is to ‘privilege Whites as a 
group at the expense of non-Whites’ (Mill, 2007: 157). In this way, ‘all Whites are 
beneficiaries of the contract, though some Whites are not signatories to it.' (1997: 59). 
White people are oblivious to racism and white domination as a result of an oppressive 
‘institutionalized politico-economic structure’ operating through economic exploitation, 
uneven distribution of public goods and services such as housing and violence of the 
prison, army and police (Mills, 1997: 4; Sullivan and Tuana, 2007). These structural 
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social and economic conditions produce identities and modes of belief that are 
‘epistemically defective’ (Alcoff, 2007). Racialised ignorance is constructed, sustained 
and perpetuated through institutions and the media, which importantly for this paper, 
includes education, universities and research (Davis, 2010; Phoenix, 2010; Sullivan, 
2007; Yancy, 2015).   
 
To produce such phenomenal and sustained ignorance of racism and white domination, 
white people perform ‘carefully crafted methods of not knowing’ (May 2006: 109). Such 
epistemic practices include cognitive, perceptive and affective processes on a spectrum 
including ‘misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, self-deception, historical 
amnesia, and moral rationalization’ (Mills 1997: 190). As a result of these individual and 
collective practices, white do not see themselves or their world as oppressive, and when 
presented with countervailing evidence, find ways to dismiss the evidence (Alcoff, 
2007).  Thus, ignorance involves denying the epistemic authority of others through 
active ‘hostility toward the testimony and credibility of non-white people’ (Sullivan and 
Tuana, 2007: 3). Systemically, some ‘knowers’ and understandings of the world are 
heard and others marginalized or derided (May, 2006: 110).  As Vivian May writes:  
 
There are many things those in dominant groups are taught not to know, 
encouraged not to see, and the privileged are rewarded for this state of not-
knowing.  Wilful ignorance is in other words, explicitly taught (although this fact 
is then usually denied such that social inequalities are not socially constructed 
and regulated but, instead, the result of genes or nature, merit or hard work, or 
culture). ...Those who are ‘invited’ to partake of the privileges of the dominant 
social order (for example, via education) are forcefully asked to comply, to 
participate in wilful ignorance or face failure, marginalization (ibid: 113).  
 
The main point May stresses here is the multifaceted nature of wilful ignorance, and the 
social practices and institutions which sustain its expansiveness and intensiveness. 
There are psychological defenses at play too. White people want to be ‘immunised’ 
from knowing more (Spelmen, 2007). Thus, ‘White America remains unable to believe 
that Black America’s grievances are real; they are unable to believe this because they 
cannot face what this fact says about themselves and their country’ (Baldwin, 1985: 536 
cited Spelman, 2007: 119). Wilful ignorance entails an ‘agreement to know the world 
wrongly that is rewarded and encouraged because it serves to maintain the status quo’ 
(May, 2006: 109).   
 
White Feminist Complicity  
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Black feminists have repeatedly shown how wilful ignorance structures white 
feminism, even when the latter claims to be anti-racist (Moreton-Robinson, 2000; 2010; 
Sullivan and Tuana, 2007). Indeed, some authors suggest that white feminists’ 
investment in being and doing ‘good’ means that we cannot see how we are 
epistemically flawed, misrepresent our own interventions, do not hear Black feminist 
critiques, and reap benefits from racism (Appelbaum, 2010; Davis, 2010; Haggis & 
Schech, 2000; Moreton-Robinson, 2000). Over forty years ago, white feminist Adrienne 
Rich (1979) admonished white feminism about its white solipsism and complicity in 
racism.   
 
Critical race theorists caution how critical whiteness studies can intensify white 
people’s need to be seen as good and reproduce white ignorance, sand narcissism 
(Ahmed, 2004; 2005; Appelbaum, 2010; Chow, 2002; Grimes, 2000; 2001; Wiegman, 
1999). They caution how white people attempts at praxis turn into self-feeling. Thus, 
Ahmed assails that when white people feel bad on behalf of black and minority ethnic 
people, they reproduce a fantasy that they know how the other feels, a form of 
appropriation, in which ‘the pain of others becomes ‘ours’ (2005: 74).  In ‘taking on’ this 
feeling of pain, she suggests that white people start to feel good about their capacity for 
empathy, identification and feelings of shame.  In a related critique, Sarit Srivastava 
(2005) argues white feminists construct themselves as good, non-racist, kind and caring 
through a ‘personalized antiracist ethic’ of confession (2005: 31).  This works to prove an 
individual’s goodness and lack of ignorance and racism. Anti-racism in this form 
becomes individualised moral self-development not organizational change (2005: 44). In 
her words, ‘empathy anti-racism’ becomes a ‘character reference’ rather a form of 
‘political analysis’. She questions whether empathetic anti-racism, in which white 
people know better, feel better and become better people, actually mean that white 
people actually do any thing that is better. Rey Chow (2002) show how white 
benevolence claims to act as a corrective to more brutal racisms, whilst generating its 
own pernicious discrimination. As a result, white feminists can become absorbed in 
their own emotions rather than the material conditions affecting black and minority 
ethnic people (Ahmed 2005; Thompson 2003; Srivastava, 2005).  
 
Another form of praxis by white academics is to declare oneself white/racist/anti-racist. 
Ahmed (2004) cautions that these fail as anti-racist praxis because announcing oneself 
as white/racist are taken up as signs of being good practice: ‘if we admit to being bad, 
then we show that we are good’ (2004, 2005).  Such speech acts do not produce helpful 
praxis because they do not commit any individual, group or institution to anti-racist 
action. Instead, white self-reflexivity can reproduce white privilege, consolidating a 
fantasy that white people transcend whiteness and racism, and claim anti-racism as a 
source of white pride. Such declarations are ‘non-performative’ because ‘the conditions 
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are not in place that would allow such declarations to do what they say’ (2004). For 
education researcher, John Preston (2007), these declarations are classed, with the white 
confessional yet another form of white bourgeois cultural distinction in relation to 
working class white people, positioning them as deeply racist. Hence, class and gender 
inflect the performance of white goodness.  
 
So far in the paper, I have shown that white knowledge as praxis can be profoundly and 
gravely epistemically flawed, ‘distorting and perverse’ (Shannon, 2007). Moreover, 
white reflexivity can stall transformatory praxis. As white feminists we need to 
understand we actively make ignorance, and how our ideas about how to do praxis are 
related to our ignorance.  Challenging one’s own racialised ignorance is remarkably 
difficult because of the way that whiteness is structured, invested in, encouraged 
historically, psychically and structurally and ingrained in bodies and psyches 
(Appelbaum, 2016; Shannon, 2007).   One way forward is to respond to return to calls 
from critical race theorists and activists for white people to listen.  
 
White Feminist Listening 
 
There is an emergent inter-disciplinary literature on the politics of listening in relation 
to inequalities (Bicksford, 1996; Dreher, 2009; O’Donnell et al., 2009; Potter, 2015; Thill, 
2015). In particular, theorists emphasise that ethical practices of listening are not about 
good feeling, feeling better, or feeling sorted (Dreher, 2009; Thill, 2015). Listening is not 
a feel-good panacea. To make any difference, it requires a different form of white 
subjectivity and habits and theoretical groundedness. For example, in a careful account 
of her own attempts at what I would call listening as white praxis, Tanja Dreher (2009) 
argues that listening politically means not dominating the space, allowing other 
discourses to circulate, and learning without expecting the Other to teach. In summary, 
listening can discourage the ‘presumptuous and oppressive practices of speaking for’ 
(Alcoff 1991: 17).  But at the same time, a white person cannot transcend or cede their 
power or their whiteness through listening.   
 
Practically, for Dreher, ‘receptive’ listening by white people entails a shift to the 
margins of discussions, including seeking permission to listen on an ongoing basis. She 
stresses that white listening may not be welcome or appropriate, and absenting onself 
may be appropriate. Listeners must be active and work at how they listen and what 
they hear. Political listening has a clear aim of producing social change through a kind 
of consciousness-raising rather than being an interpersonal relation of consensus, 
empathy, therapy or friendship. Audrey Thompson underscores the labour required of 
white listeners:  
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You need to learn to become unintrusive, unimportant, patient to the point of 
tears, while at the same time open to learning any possible lessons. You will also 
have to come to terms with the sense of alienation, of not belonging, of having 
your world thoroughly disrupted, having it criticised and scrutinised from the 
point of view of those who have been harmed by it, having important concepts 
central to it dismissed, being viewed with mistrust, being seen as of no 
consequence except as an object of mistrust (Thompson, 2003, cited Dreher, 2009: 
12). 
 
Political listening can be understood as an epistemic practice because as Dreher and 
Thompson accentuate, listeners may hear how Others experience her whiteness and her 
feminism, pointing up why her good intentions count for little (2009: 13). This kind of 
listening is risky, painful, difficult and profoundly discomforting but as Moreton-
Robinson (2008) insists not as painful as racism for Indigenous Australians or other 
Others. Ultimately, the goal of political listening is the decentring of privileged white 
and gendered interests and feelings oriented to facilitate actions that racially 
minoritised women raise.     
 
But listening is not intrinsically progressive. Catherine Thill writes ‘there is nothing 
inherently democratic, open or transformative about listening’: it is ‘not always open, 
empathetic or transformative’ (2015: 539).  A case in point: certain kinds of listening 
technologies feature in Australian debates on the infamous Northern Territories 
Intervention but preserve the iniquitous status quo for Indigenous people (Thill, 2015). 
Alison Jones insists that ‘good intentions by the dominant group are not always 
sufficient to enable their ears to ‘hear’, and therefore for the other to ‘speak’ (1999 cited 
Dreher, 2009: 5). Moreover, she stresses ‘the possibility that the other cannot or might 
not want to be ‘known’ or consumed by them, or to teach them’ (1999 cited Dreher, 
1999: 13). Minoritised groups often have little choice but to listen to privileged voices 
rather than being heard themselves. Thus, for Dreher, an ethical form of listening entails 
creating a space and white habits where the Other can speak if she wants to. It is not 
about ‘passive openness’ nor a way to silence others or disengage from difficult 
discussions (Thill, 2015). Finally, Thill stresses the limits to what listening can achieve: 
thus she highlights that ‘what follows listening’ matters and must bring about political 
action and the redistribution of material resources.  
 
Encountering the Other 
 
A praxis of listening to the Other means ‘encountering’ the Other.  Although writing on 
listening shows how white people can become better listeners, potentially addressing 
ignorance, authors do not take into account how whiteness mediates listening bodies, 
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ears and spaces. Ahmed insists that encounters with the Other have histories and social 
relations which affect bodies and space and therefore the ability to listen. Like Dreher 
and Thill, she insists that listening is not about assuming a ‘position of listening’ or 
liberal theories of giving voice but her work extends our understanding of listening as 
white praxis (Ahmed et al, 2000: 17). Philosophically complex, her work does not come 
with easy prescriptions but challenges ideas on what it means to listen.  
 
The fulcrum of her argument is that we already recognise who and what the Other is 
before we meet them because of ideas and affects that have circulated in the media, 
policy and culture, and in our own lives (Ahmed, 2000; 2002).  As a result, Others get 
‘strangered’, even though the stranger is not that strange, given how knowable they are, 
and how close they have to get to us to be made knowably strange. Othering and 
strangering are based on epistemologies and epistemic communities. Hence, in a 
process akin to commodity fetishism, we transform the Other into a predetermined, 
pre-judged, universalised figure rather than apprehending the particularity of our 
encounters with them.  In the terms of the epistemology of white ignorance, such 
encounters with the Other reproduce already existing white knowledge and in turn, 
consolidate racialised ignorance.  
 
Particularity as a means of knowing/not knowing is critical to Ahmed’s understanding 
(2000; 2002). First, particularity is about how racial difference is made. Thus, 
particularity is not about ‘grasping the imagined difference of the Other’; not about 
‘accessing particularity through an individual’s face, body or expression’, even though 
we try to read through visual appearance, as a result ‘turning her into a ‘theme, concept 
or thing’ (2002: 563). The particularity of the Other cannot be found on or in another’s 
body (ibid). Indeed, ‘particularity…does not belong to an other’ (ibid). In Ahmed’s use, 
particularity refers to the meetings and encounters which produce others, and 
‘differentiate others from other others’.  It is the encounters themselves which 
differentiate people.  
 
Secondly then, particularity is about the historical and economic conditions and legacies 
that enable social relations: ‘the sociality of the ‘with’ (2002: 581). Individual, colonial 
and geo-political pasts and identifications and misrecognitions shape our meetings with 
the Other. Encounters are re-encounters in that they carry traces of what has already 
taken place (2000: 17). They are not discrete events. Difference is produced in relations 
to other encounters that are determined in other spaces and times. Thus, when we meet 
the Other face to face, we also meet ‘other others’. But there is also a specificity to our 
encounters. So the epistemic questions to ask are what made temporal and spatial 
conditions make this encounter possible: how did we arrive here? How is our meeting 
eventuated by other places and times? What does it make possible, what futures are 
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opened up? (2002: 582) How come some faces and not others are encountered? Hence, 
what makes an encounter particular is precisely the history that the encounter re- 
opens, as well as the future that it might open up (2002: 568). What we know about the 
Other does not start in this meeting or in the present.  
 
Thirdly, encounters are mediated by non-presence. When we meet Others, they have 
traces of different histories, lives, forms and textualities. Hence, the Other is not ‘fully 
present in this very moment of the face-to-face’. (2002: 563). Ahmed argues that even 
when we hear things with others: ‘there are always other encounters, other speech acts, 
scars and traumas, that remain unspoken, unvoiced or not fully spoken or voiced’ 
(2000:156). Thus, ‘non-presentness’ structures the particularity of encounters. For 
Ahmed, ethical praxis means we must develop knowledge of what is not fully 
presented and not absent. The mediated nature of our encounters mean that 
communication ‘does not take place in the present, nor it is about presence’ (ibid).  
 
But this is not about a call for a liberal communicative strategy of dialogue, for ‘the 
rendering present of the other’s voice’, Ahmed emphasizes (ibid). In this ‘generous 
encounter’, speaking is not the praxis because history can not be fully presented. As 
praxis entails ‘an ethics of communication’, which facilitates what cannot be spoken, is 
ungraspable and unrealisable. In order words, Ahmed shows us that we will need a 
different kind of listening to hear what is not ‘present as voice’, nor got across in the 
‘here’ and ‘the now’ of the encounter’. It is ‘hidden in the mouths that cannot speak’ but 
‘always yonder or approaching, elsewhere and otherwise to the immediacy of ‘this 
encounter’ and conveyed through a kind of touch (2002: 565).  This form of listening is 
about non-mastery of the Other, accepting unfinished and incomplete knowledge, 
enabling surprise and non-strangering.  
 
Praxis  
 
Having provided a comprehensive discussion of philosophical insights on ignorance, 
listening and encounters,  in this final section I ask how these could inform a white 
feminist praxis for diversity and organisational research.  
 
Challenging ignorance  
 
We need to to understand how we actively make ignorance, and how our ideas about 
how to do praxis are related to ignorance.  As white feminists can start to explore our 
epistemic community’s ignorance and how our practices of knowing, unknowing and 
not knowing relate to racism and colonialism, and are motivated, deliberate and self-
serving (Shannon, 2006). Moreover, Mills stresses that our positionality affects the 
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questions ask and that white ignorance involves not asking certain questions 
(Appelbaum, 2008: 296). As organisational theorists, we need to research the structured 
ways in which ignorance is managed and examine our own and others’ labour needed 
to produce it. José Medina (2013) argues that academics have a ‘heightened epistemic 
responsibility’ to challenge individual and collective ignorance by obtaining some self-
knowledge, knowledge of others and empirical knowledge of the world. In particular, 
we should understand how our lives are entangled with the lives of others, and which 
social positions and network of social relations we and others are located in.  Inattention 
to ignorance is further complicity, making us epistemically irresponsible and unethical 
researchers. To challenge our ignorance requires an active openness and vigilance in 
relation to limitations, distortions, lapses, and omissions in our knowledge. He 
advocates bringing in difference perspectives to research to create epistemic friction 
amongst people to challenge and help each other improve knowledge. As well as 
extending our theoretical resources and listening to anti-racist scholars and activists, we 
can also participate in social media, learning from blogs, twitter, and other activist 
media. As organisational researchers, we have to see organisations as contexts in which 
ignorance is further organised and distributed and find ways to challenge the ways we 
think through finding methods and ideas which bring epistemic friction to our thinking 
and being (Alcoff, 2007).  
 
Critical race theorists vary in their belief in white people’s abilities to challenge 
ignorance. For example, Mills sees the payoffs from whiteness as too substantial for 
white people to renege on the racial contract. Alcoff (1998) writes in highly modulated 
language that that some white people some of the time to some degree abhor white 
supremacy and want to find better ways to do things. Sullivan and Yancy point to the 
the generational, habitual and unconscious ways in which we as white people protect 
ourselves from understanding our part in racism. Yancy believes that ‘unflinching 
…pedagogical criticality’ can ‘afford ways of doing whiteness differently‘ (2015: 33). But 
whiteness ‘ambushes’. Therefore, vigilance and tarrying are key: indeed ‘antiracism is a 
process, not a state of being or something fixed and finally achieved’ (2015:21). The 
antiracist racist is precisely a white person who recognizes the complexity of ‘undoing’ 
white racism, and who thinks through the implications of what it means to be white. 
Others are more pessimistic. Ahmed argues (2004) that ‘we cannot simply unlearn 
privilege when the cultures in which learning take place are shaped by privilege’. 
Indigenous Australian feminist Aileen Moreton-Robinson writes that, ‘the real 
challenge for white feminists is to theorise the relinquishment of power’ (2000: 186).  
 
To make a start, we as white diversity researchers need to educate ourselves on our 
individual and collective epistemic flaws and psychic processes, working together to 
critique and challenge our research and teaching practices (Grimes 2001, 2002).  
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Practically, we could focus on developing reading groups and resources, consciousness-
raising and educational groups, and specially convened conference streams and 
symposia focused on racism and whiteness.  We could learn about educational 
processes and techniques from scholars in the field of anti-racist education, and start 
with listening (Warren and Hytten, 2004; Utt and Tochluk, 2016; Logue, 2008; Tochluk, 
2010, 2013).  
 
Listening  
 
Equality praxis needs white people to listen carefully to the exposing of racism by 
racially minoritised others and how racism structures the present. This means that we 
should learn about our own and other forms of racialisation and how these operate in 
organisations, including universities where we work. Moreover, in listening we let go of 
control and dominating (Warren and Hytten, 2004). To do this, we need to undertake 
sustained reading of critical race and postcolonial theories and non-fiction in order to 
learn about our histories, whiteness, and racism, to ground ourselves in practical, 
critical ‘self-work’ guided by non white discourses (Utt and Tochluk, 2016).  
 
Hence, the epistemic resources that we use to make theory about organisation, 
diversity, whiteness, gender and other axes of difference need expanding so we can 
understand how racism underpins organisational processes, including those which 
bestow white privilege including recruitment, performance reviews, promotion, pay, 
workplace power, leadership and ideals of the somatic norm and the right fit (Grimes, 
2001; Nkomo, 2009; Nkomo and Al Ariss, 2014; Puwar, 2004). It means we need to 
design research in ways in which accounts of racism can be solicited and represented in 
research, and we denaturalise colourblindness, meritocracy and inequality (Demirtürk, 
2012). And we need to ask ourselves and each other how ignorance produces research 
designs, analysis and interpretations; methods and interactions with research 
participants; theories and publications. Indeed, we should explore how the category of 
diversity and its associated practices operate as a means to further ignorance of racism? 
We should also listen to the experiences of those racially minoritised colleagues and 
students in relation to the whiteness and racism of universities, recognising their 
epistemic authority and credibility (Alcoff, 2007). 
 
To listen means for white people to take on their role and responsibility in these 
histories of racism and to understand them as ‘histories of this present’. And rather 
moving into wanting to act, white people need to see that the racist world that is 
critiqued is where they live (Ahmed, 2007). If white people turn to action too soon, 
wanting ‘to know how things can be different too quickly, then we might not hear 
anything at all. (2007: 165). It can reproduce a ‘defence against hearing about racism as 
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an ongoing and unfinished history that we have yet to describe fully’. (2007:165) This 
means we turn away from white solipsism – self-loathing or self-glorification -  and 
towards others (Ahmed, 2000; 2007). This means recognising and interrupting white 
savior, missionary and superiority complexes (Tochluk, 2010; Warren and Hytten, 2004) 
and that understanding racism does not necessarily make us anti-racist (Ahmed, 2007; 
Yancy, 2015).  
 
The labour of listening 
 
Whilst literature on listening points to political possibilities, critical race theorists 
underline how difficult white people find it to listen to accounts of racism, and their 
participation in, and benefitting from, racism. Philosophers of white ignorance show 
how the pay offs for white people and their attachment to being good mediates the 
ability to be able to hear and care about racism.  For instance, Alcoff writes:  
 
It is a feature of…race privilege that white people have a choice whether to to 
hear or not to hear and respond or not respond to the demands and criticism of 
women of color. Racism differentially distributes epistemic authority to make 
judgments and determinations (1998: 110.  
 
Moreover, individual and collective practices and habits of evading, marginalising, 
distancing, countering, denying, producing accounts of their experiences of inequality 
move in quickly (Appelbaum, 2010).  
 
And at the same time, critical race theorists are in no doubt that addressing inequalities 
and oppression require white listening, indeed ‘fearless listening’ (Yancy, 2015).  To 
counter these historical, deeply engrained and rewarded processes requires complex 
responses. Yancy (2015) stresses that it is difficult for us to escape the deep rabbit hole 
of whiteness.  
 
whites must learn when and how to be silent, when not to move too quickly to 
disagree or, for that matter, agree with people of color…For white people, silence 
and the dynamism of tarrying can create spaces of openness; create important 
moments of vulnerability, of being wounded, of coming to admit, though 
painfully, that they thought they knew themselves in ways that they have now 
come to realize that they were mistaken (Yancy, 2015: 28).  
 
Ultimately, this requires us as white people to live with ‘emotional and cognitive 
dissonance’ and the crisis that accompanies the realisation on how we and our lives are 
‘entangled in the social and psychic web of white racism’ (Yancy, 2008: 26). But he is 
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hopeful that we can uncover, identify, face and challenge structures of whiteness 
(Yancy, 2015: 26). To do this means recognising our unconscious investment in 
whiteness and ignorance and our individual and collective mechanisms of defense 
(Logue, 2008). Anti-racist educators stress how we need to work at being affected by 
hearing about the facts and the emotions of racism and sit with emotional discomfort 
and humility (Logue, 2008; Utt and Tochluk, 2016).  This means working on being a 
‘concrete subject of struggle’ neither an enemy nor ally, but working on our 
ambivalence and exploration (Utt and Tochluk, 2016).  We have to ask ourselves how 
committed we really are to increasing our understanding and commitment to fighting 
racism? We need to reflecting on how our social identities have given us advantages. 
All of this  means learning in fits and starts, being tentative, staying flawed and not 
making linear progress (Utt and Tochluk, 2016).  At the same time, we need to challenge 
our white solipsism:  speaking, thinking and imagining whiteness describes the world 
and to recognise that we can be ‘ignorant, oblivious, arrogant and destructive’ all the 
time we think of ourselves as good (Appelbaum, 2008: 296).  
 
Generous encounters 
 
To work on our knowledge of racism and whiteness begs the question of how we 
encounter the Other through ‘embodied ethics’ (Pullen and Rhodes, 2015). In essence, 
we need to  understand how structures of power mediate and frame the encounter 
itself. More specifically, in Ahmed’s terms, generous encountering means getting closer 
to the Other so that the differences produced in the encounter through social 
antagonism and struggle can be felt as part of very encounter itself. But it is also about 
staying distant so that there is no expectation of overcoming difference, full knowledge 
of or merger with the Other. As a result, common ground cannot be not assumed but 
worked at. This means that a praxis of generous encounters is not about speaking but 
being touched by what cannot be got across, ‘what moves between subjects not through 
voice or speech’ (2002: 564-565). As she writes:  
 
In the very ‘painstaking labour’ of getting closer, of speaking to each other, and 
of working for each other, we also get closer to ‘other others’. a community that is 
without ground, and yet not ungrounded (2002: 571) 
 
In ways which are elusive and not easily reduced to prescription, Ahmed is 
encouraging us to challenge our ignorance-making practices of Othering by listening to 
the unknowable and ungraspable. This means not fixing, pinning down or knowing the 
Other and as she writes, feeling the past and being open to the ‘not yet’ and means 
recognising how the encounter itself is implicated in broader relations and circuits of 
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production and exchange' (2000:152). So in our research practices we need to reflect on 
how our meetings with Others eventuated? What historical and political conditions 
enabled us to meet? This might mean thinking about colonialism or migration, or our 
own biographies as classed and gendered subjects. It means thinking about who we 
don't meet and why? And how our meetings with others links us to other others and 
their histories. For example, Encarnacion Gutiérrez-Rodríguez (2015) shows how 
racialised gendered inequalities structure the neoliberal university through institutional 
racism, migration policies, the coloniality of knowledge, historically perceptions, 
institutional logics and everyday practices of racism.  These structure university 
encounters between academics, and academics and students.  
Generous encounters means reflecting on white bodily habits in knowledge and 
ignorance production. Research and academia are imagined as disembodied and 
disregarded with white academic authority seen to lie in ‘pure mind’ (Perrier et al., 
2015; Swan, 2005). White bodies can make encounters ungenerous. Thus, in thinking 
about diversity research encounters, we need to reflect on how the academy, 
conferences, and research contexts- the conditions of meeting the Other - are structured 
by white middle class masculine academic embodied habits and space. The whiteness 
in the university can be understood as ‘an ongoing and unfinished history, which 
orientates bodies in specific directions, affecting how they `take up' space, and what 
they `can do' (2009: 149). In other words, whiteness is produced through what is in 
reach, to hand – including our methods, capacities, books, concepts, resources. Grimes 
writes that we need to acknowledge our citational practices and recognise the racial 
identities of our writers. This will  show what we put in reach and tend towards and 
extend what others who read our work may do.  
 
Our bodily and spatial orientations are the product of habits tending towards objects 
shapes bodies and worlds (2007: 55). Thus, ‘we apprehend the world of shared 
inheritance, as well as ‘who’ or ‘what’ we direct our energy and attention toward (ibid). 
A shared inheritance in whiteness affects how we ‘inhabit space’ and ‘who’ or ‘what’ 
we orient ourselves towards, repeating white habits and producing white space.  ‘Race 
becomes, in this model, a question of what is within reach, what is available to perceive 
and to do ‘things’ with. (Ahmed, 2009: 154). These orientations enable we are white 
people to move easily and feel at home in organisations, while minoritised others can 
feel out of place. The habitual actions of bodies give organizations a habitual shape of 
whiteness: thus, ‘spaces acquire the shape of the bodies that “inhabit” them’ (Ahmed, 
2007: 156). As a result, white people can take up more space, do and reach more in 
organizations, extending ‘into spaces that have already taken their shape’ (Ahmed, 
2007: 158). Thus, white ignorance is made by  orientations in workplaces and 
universities. As Ahmed writes, racism is evident in ‘what ‘we’ have already done, 
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whereby the ‘we’ is an effect of the doing. (2010: 45).  The upshot for white academic 
praxis is that a failure to challenge our intellectual, spatial and bodily inheritance in 
academia reproduces whiteness, which profoundly what racialised bodies can do.  
 
This means we diversity researchers should attend to the institutional racism, 
inequalities and embodied encounters in universities, and the organisations we 
research. Shirley Tate writes that the ‘ordinariness of racism in academia’ makes 
universities ‘unliveable’ for black scholars with its exclusions and white sociability 
(2014). Hence, we need to think about our minds but also our bodies. As several 
theorists stress, white privilege is about bodily styles and ways of moving, unconscious 
habits of white expansiveness, taking the floor and being central stage is at our disposal 
(Ahmed; Appelbaum, 2008; Puwar; Sullivan, 2006).  Ignorance is generationally and 
bodily transmitted through habits and inattention (Sullivan, 2006). White bodies and 
habits – ‘ordinary gestures, comments, gazes or remarks, while they seem to be fleeting, 
hit bodies profoundly’ leading to feelings of injury and isolation (2015: 7). The white 
somatic norm becomes the ideal for racially minoritised academics and students to 
approximate to but one they can only fail to achieve (Puwar, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, we need to reflect on how the racial contract is sustained in part through 
education to give white people advantages through access to resources and status? And 
we need to question how the ‘white somatic norm’ of academia and its imagined 
objectivity and impartiality inflect these encounters (Puwar, 2004). A rhetoric of 
diversity having been achieved in universities means that teaching on racism is seen as 
no longer necessary, and the progression of racially minoritised academics marginal 
(Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 2015).  Fears of being discriminated against and lack of support 
results in racially minoritised people staying silent about their everyday experiences of 
racism in the university. Against this backdrop of oppression and privilege, the weight 
of these structures of ignorance and racist legacies, it will be difficult for those of us 
who white researchers to pursue ‘generous encounters’ with the Other in diversity 
research. Toni Johnson (2013) recommends a praxis in which knowability and 
unknowability are practised through acknowledging multiple forms of communication 
– silence, body language, stories, and histories -  together with a relativising of 
strangering as someone already known. This kind of praxis is not simply cognitive but 
affective and embodied, risky, painful, daunting and ontologically destabilising.  
 
Social change 
 
Listening must bring about political action, some of which is led by white feminists and 
others by racially minoritised people. Indeed, the strength of minoritised power, 
agency,  political activism, and survival strategies and political activism should not be 
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underestimated, even in organisational work contexts (Puwar, 2004; Lugones cited 
Hoagland, 2007).  Going beyond listening and generous encounters in research and 
teaching,  white feminists can get involved in activist struggles for racial justice and 
build a white anti-racist community of researchers (Tochluk, 2013). We can improve our 
practices by learning about anti-racist policies, research guidelines and accountability  
put forward by activist groups (Tochluk, 2013).  Further studies can be undertaken as 
recommended by Nkomo and Al Ariss on different national and workplace histories of 
white privilege and their repercussions including how it is inflected by colonialism and 
globalisation. More work can be done on intersectionality and whiteness, illuminating 
how privilege is unevenly distributed through workplace mechanisms by class, gender 
and heteronormativity, and how some racially minoritised workers feel ebbs and flows 
workplace privileges (Holvino, 2010; Atewologun and Sealy, 2014). A critical focus will 
be researching the mechanisms and practices through racial inequality is maintained in 
media, education, workplaces, social institutions (Demirtürk, 2012). Intense questions 
are raised by critical race theorists as to whether white people can address systemic 
racism in which they are deeply implicated and view white praxis with suspicion and 
cynicism but the ideas and questions raised in this section go someway to disinvesting 
in whiteness and ignorance in small practical ways, with fits and starts, aiming for 
generous encounters.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I respond to the call for a discussion of praxis in diversity studies by 
drawing on critical race theorists and propose that listening, challenging racism, and 
developing generous encounters in our research could enable a viable praxis for white 
researchers . What this paper shows is that black scholarship and activists insist that we 
as white people acknowledge our implication in past and present forms of racism. 
These demands require that we white people stop in our tracks, and repel our urge to 
turn away from racism and move into doing things that we are think are right and 
good. What this really means is a more complex, difficult, painful ‘embodied ethics’ and 
understanding, and coming to terms with how the racist and colonial pasts shapes the 
present and future (Pullen and Rhodes, 2015). This does not mean that white feminists 
and racially minoritised women and men cannot find ways to create alliances and 
networks. For example, George Lipsitz details a case study where a coalition between 
Native Americans and white allies was developed which new racial identities based on 
‘dynamics of difference and solidarities of sameness’ (2008: 121).  But part of the future 
for white people will be to acknowledge the growing challenges to white dominance in 
society and the cracks in whiteness which are showing (Alcoff, 2015; Demirtürk, 2012 ).  
All in our praxis should be ‘cautious and careful’ (Warren and Hytten, 2004: 331).  
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Whilst we often think about praxis as grounded in hopes about the future, Ahmed 
shows us how the past - individual and collective histories –undergird our epistemic 
habits and our praxis. She stresses that it in understanding the past that we can find 
new futures of equality:   
 
Feminism is always...future orientated, as a politics that not only calls into 
question the way in which the world is organized in the present, but also seeks to 
transform how the world is organized and engender new ways and forms of 
living. But what kinds of futures are imagined by feminists? …it is through 
attending to the multiplicity of the pasts that are never simply behind us, 
through the traces they leave in the encounters we have in the present, that we 
can open up the promise of the ‘not yet’. (Ahmed, 2002: 558-559) 
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